In Floro v Owners – Units Plan No 630 (Unit Titles)  ACAT 4 the applicant, Ms Floro, sought a review of a decision of the respondent owners corporation to decline to grant owners within the complex a ‘special privilege’ to erect support poles for a carport on an area of common property adjoining their units.
The resolution was opposed by one of the twenty six members of the owners corporation (the Objector) but given the requirement for unanimous approval, the opposition of one person was sufficient to ensure that the resolution was not successful. Neither the Objector nor the owners corporation participated in the ACAT proceedings.
In summary, the proposal allowed the owners of several units to put up practical and useful carports. The proposal appeared to have a minimal impact on the common property and was consistent with other current uses of the common property. No person, including the Objector, pointed to any evidence that the proposal could have any effect on any person’s material enjoyment of their property, or even of the common property. Indeed, no basis for an objection to the motion was advanced at all.
When assessing the unreasonableness of the objection to the motion, Senior Member Robinson turned to the recent High Court decision in Ainsworth v Albrecht  HCA 40 which considered the concept of unreasonableness as it appears in the Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (QLD). This Queensland decision concerned a similar application but was brought under the Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997. ACAT held that while the Queensland Act is different to the ACT legislation in some respects, the concept of reasonableness was sufficiently common that the reasoning of the High Court should be applied by ACAT.
In Ainsworth, the High Court provided some guidance on the concept of unreasonableness in the context of reviews of decisions of owners corporations. The majority held that the unreasonableness of opposition to a proposal can only be determined by considering the circumstances of the proposal and its likely impact on the opponents’ property interests. However, consideration of whether a person is acting unreasonably in protecting their property interest does not require that they act with altruism or sympathy for the interests of the proponent. Lot owners are entitled to take steps in their own self-interest to protect their property interests. In the Queensland case, it was sufficient that the objectors had a reasonable apprehension that the proposal would adversely affect their property rights and consequently opposition could not be said to be unreasonable.
The High Court in Ainsworth held that the first step in considering whether the opposition was unreasonable is identification of a ground of opposition and the second step is an enquiry into whether that ground is a rational basis for opposition.
In this ACAT case, the difficulty was defining the interest to be protected given neither the owners corporation nor the Objector had articulated it. Consequently, while ACAT could theorise the basis upon which an objection might be made, there was no evidence that any of those rationales was the basis for the objection in this case and consequently ACAT held that an objection to a resolution, without any basis, was unreasonable.